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It’s a “Criming Shame”: Moving from
Land Use Ethics to Criminalization
of Behavior Leading to Permits
and Other Zoning Related Acts
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Bailey Ince**
I. Introduction
ANNUAL REVIEWS OF CASES INVOLVING ALLEGATIONS OF ETHICAL VIOLATIONS
in land use typically reveal situations where members of planning or
zoning boards or local legislative bodies have a real or perceived con-
flict of interest in their role as decisionmakers.1 These conflicts of in-
terest arise due to personal relationships with an applicant or neighbor,
employment situations, or investments that could lead to decisions
made in self-interest. Typically, these ethical dilemmas are resolved
under state and local ethics laws, often laws aimed at directing the
public officials involved to disclose or recuse themselves from the
decision-making process.2
Violations for failing to adhere to these ethics laws may include
civil sanctions, removal from office and the imposition of misdemeanor
penalties. Except for the rare misdemeanor prosecution, state and local
governments typically treat ethics violations as civil matters, and from
a review of the reported case law over the years, a large number of the
situations involving allegations of unethical conduct are dismissed by
the courts because the statute or local law did not specifically cover
*Patricia Salkin is Dean and Professor of Law at Touro Law Center. She is the au
thor of the five volume American Law of Zoning and the four volume New York Zon
ing Law and Practice. Salkin frequently writes and lectures on the subject of ethics and
land use.
**Bailey Ince is a 2013 graduate of Touro Law Center where he served as New
York Constitutional Law Editor on the TOURO LAW REVIEW.
1. See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, 2009 Ethical Considerations in Land Use, 41 URB.
LAW. 529 (2009); Patricia E. Salkin, Crime Doesn’t Pay and Neither Do Conflicts of
Interest in Land Use Decisionmaking, 40 URB. LAW. 561 (2008).
2. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 2 2 121(5) (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D 69
(West 2013).
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the underlying action.3 In recent years, however, annual reviews of
cases involving allegations of ethical violations in land use have re-
vealed a growing number of reported criminal cases. These cases
largely involve criminal law issues, yet the underlying gravamen of
the initial actions stem from conduct involving the land use permitting
process.4
In the last two decades, federal prosecutors have convicted more
than 20,000 defendants involved in public corruption.5 That staggering
figure includes the convictions of federal, state, and local officials, as
well as private citizens involved in the corruption.6 Perhaps more in-
credible is that even after putting thousands of corrupt officials behind
bars, instances of public corruption are not abating. Recently, a United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York commented on
this situation, characterizing it as “a culture of corruption [that] has de-
veloped and grown, just like barnacles on a boat bottom.”7 In fact,
Manhattan prosecutors who have already gained reputations for “col-
laring crooked government officials” have pledged to redouble their
efforts and fight corruption more aggressively in the future.8 Addition-
ally, one of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s top agency-wide pri-
orities remains combating public corruption, behind eliminating ter-
rorist threats, protecting the U.S. against foreign intelligence and
espionage threats, and cyber-warfare attacks.9 According to Robert
Mueller III, the Director of the FBI, the Bureau has doubled the num-
ber of agents in the public corruption sector, and consequently the
number of investigations has spiked as well.10
3. E.g., Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343 (2011).
4. See, e.g., Blackmon v. Richmond Cnty., 162 S.E.2d 436 (Ga. 1968); Gooding
Cnty. v. Wybenga, 46 P.3d 18 (Idaho 2002).
5. PUB. INTEGRITY SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE AC-
TIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 2011 28 (2011), http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/pin/docs/2011 Annual Report.pdf (tracking the number of
convictions of corrupt public officials from 1992 through 2011).
6. Id.
7. James M. Odato, Just like barnacles on a boat, TIMES UNION, Apr. 23, 2013,
http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Just like barnacles on a boat 4453477.php;
see also Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, Overcriminalization and the Fallout
from ‘Skilling’, 245 N.Y. L.J. 2, Jan. 4, 2011 (discussing legislative and prosecutorial
efforts to prosecute corrupt public officials), http://www.maglaw.com/publications/arti
cles/00239/ res/id=Attachments/index=0/070011116Morvillo.pdf.
8. Odato, supra note 7.
9. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TODAY’S FBI: FACTS & FIGURES
2013 2014 7 (2014), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats services/publications/todays
fbi facts figures/facts and figures 031413.pdf/view [hereinafter TODAY’S FBI: FACTS &
FIGURES 2013 2014].
10. Robert S. Mueller III, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at the Amer
ican Bar Association Litigation Section Annual Conference (Apr. 17, 2008) (transcript
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One of the primary reasons for law enforcement’s increase in at-
tention to public corruption is its substantial impact: it “strikes at
the heart of government, eroding public confidence and undermining
the strength of our democracy.”11 When the integrity of the govern-
ing officials—who are supposed to place public service above self-
interest—is sacrificed for personal benefit, the public’s confidence
in government is sacrificed as well. At the root, self-interest and
self-dealing are essentially ethics violations with the officials violat-
ing their fiduciary duties to their constituents. The solution, so far,
has been to impose higher standards of ethics on government officials
and sometimes, depending on how severe the unethical conduct is,
impose criminal penalties as well. The recent attention given to the
issue and the increasingly visible role that federal law enforcement
officials are taking is indicative of a growing plague of corruption
sweeping the nation.12
One of the areas in which reported instances of public corruption
has seen a dramatic increase in federal prosecutions is at the local
level of government dealing with land use. In the past, land use ethics
inquiries predominately involved conflicts of interest or an official
holding public office while engaging in a previously held business
or law practice. Now, prosecutors are looking at the underlying crim-
inality of the unethical acts carried out in the context of land use de-
cisions.13 With a wide array of criminal statutes in the hands of federal
prosecutors, almost all forms of unethical conduct could in some way
also violate a federal criminal statute.14
available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/corporate fraud and public corruption
are we becoming more crooked).
11. TODAY’S FBI: FACTS & FIGURES 2013 2014, supra note 9, at 38.
12. See Ed Pilkington, New Jersey scandal highlights cycle of ongoing corruption:
Pundits in the state express frustration at inability to rout out pervasive corruption at
a local level, THE GUARDIAN (July 24, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/ju
l/24/new jersey corruption mayors rabbis (describing why, in 2009, law enforcement
officials arrested forty four public officials for corruption); Thomas J. Gradel & Dick
Simpson, Patronage, Cronyism and Criminality in Chicago Government Agencies,
Feb. 2011, http://www.uic.edu/depts/pols/ChicagoPolitics/AntiCorruptionReport 4.
pdf (detailing roughly 400 public corruption arrests in Chicago in the last two
decades).
13. Again, FBI field offices continue to fight public corruption at all levels of gov
ernment and in all capacities, specifically referencing the crimes that could stem from
all fields related to land use. See, e.g., Birmingham Division, FBI.GOV, http://
www.fbi.gov/birmingham/about us/priorities/priorities (last visited Mar. 18, 2014)
(describing the duties of the Birmingham Division of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation).
14. Title 18 U.S.C. § 201, the federal bribery statute, has been interpreted narrowly,
unlike its stepchildren: the honest services fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which ex
pands upon § 201 to cover more public officials; the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951,
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Part II of this article reviews the federal statutes most often used by
federal prosecutors and provides some examples of recent reported
cases in which the underlying illegal or unethical conduct involved al-
leged criminal activity. Part III offers some examples of recent re-
ported state court cases in which criminal acts involving land use
permitting or decision-making were the underlying cause of the subse-
quent or reported court action. Part IV concludes with the caveat that
municipal attorneys and public officials can no longer simply view
ethical issues in land use as a local or state civil matter, and those
who work in and advise those in the public sector should be mindful
of the tools at the disposal of federal investigators and prosecutors.
II. Federal Criminal Conduct in the Land Use Context
A. 18 U.S.C. § 201—Bribing a Public Official
Public officials guilty of federal corruption charges are most fre-
quently convicted of accepting a bribe.15 Bribing a government offi-
cial—or accepting a bribe as an official—is inherently unethical be-
cause the official renders a decision tainted by self-interest to obtain
a personal benefit, and the resulting outcome may not be in the pub-
lic’s best interest. While every state has penal laws that prohibit this
type of conduct and prescribe appropriate criminal penalties, often
the local jurisdiction is unenthusiastic about addressing situations in-
volving political players who may be viewed as peers or friends. Fur-
thermore, local prosecutorial offices are often understaffed and chal-
lenged to prioritize street crimes and to deal with public safety
issues rather than pursuing corrupt officials. Increasingly, the federal
government has been stepping in to fill this prosecutorial void.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 201 prohibits both bribery and the acceptance of
certain gratuities by a public official to influence an official act.16 The
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Sun-Diamond Grow-
which criminalizes extortion under the color of official right; and 18 U.S.C. § 666,
which has become almost a general anti corruption statute with an expansive scope.
Additionally, while § 201 requires proof of a quid pro quo, or the receiving of a benefit
in exchange for something (which is a government act in the public corruption con
text), § 1346 does not. There is a federal circuit court split on whether § 666 requires
proof of a quid pro quo.
15. Corruption Update: A Busy Month Comes to a Close, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.
gov/news/stories/2011/june/corruption 063011/corruption 063011 (last visited Mar. 18,
2014).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(c) (2012); see also United States v. Sun Diamond Growers
of California, 526 U.S. 398, 404 05 (1999) (explaining the statute’s prohibitions).
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ers of California17 provided the clearest description of the two crimes,
stating:
The first crime, described in § 201(b)(1) as to the giver, and § 201(b)(2) as to the
recipient, is bribery, which requires a showing that something of value was cor
ruptly given, offered, or promised to a public official (as to the giver) or corruptly
demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed to be received or accepted by a
public official (as to the recipient) with intent, inter alia, ‘to influence any official
act’ (giver) or in return for ‘being influenced in the performance of any official act”
(recipient). The second crime, defined in § 201(c)(1)(A) as to the giver, and in
§ 201(c)(1)(B) as to the recipient, is illegal gratuity, which requires a showing
that something of value was given, offered, or promised to a public official (as to
the giver), or demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed to be received or ac
cepted by a public official (as to the recipient), ‘for or because of any official act
performed or to be performed by such public official.’18
In other words, a public official is guilty of accepting a bribe under
§ 201(b) when he receives something of value from a third party that
is intended to influence the performance of his duties as a public offi-
cial.19 The agreement must include a quid pro quo, that is, something
of value in exchange for an official act.20
The timing of the illegal gratuity under § 201(c) is irrelevant—it
could have been given and received before an official act is commenced
or after the act is completed.21 Furthermore, the “thing of value” could
also constitute an illegal gratuity if it is given to an official for an act
that the official has already decided to execute, similar to an apprecia-
tive gesture.22 One of the last elements to establish a violation of this
statute is that the government must prove that the bribe or illegal gratu-
ity is directly linked to a specific official act.23
The distinguishing element of each of these crimes is the intent: to
be convicted of bribery, one must intend to influence an official act or
to be influenced in performing an official act, while accepting or giv-
ing an illegal gratuity only requires that the gratuity be given or ac-
cepted “for or because of” an official act.24 Under § 201(b), bribery,
either the recipient or giver must intend to receive or give something
in exchange for a specific, desired official action (quid pro quo), whereas
under § 201(c) an illegal gratuity “may constitute merely a reward for
17. 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
18. Id. at 404.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 404 05.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 404.
23. Id. at 414.
24. Id. at 404 05.
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some future act that the public official will take (and may already have
determined to take), or for a past act that he has already taken.”25
Another distinguishing factor of the two crimes is the punishment
upon conviction. Someone guilty of bribery could be sentenced to up
to 15 years of imprisonment, a fine of $250,000 (or triple the value
of the bribe, whichever is greater), and disqualification from holding of-
fice.26 On the other hand, violating the illegal gratuity statute could lead
to a sentence of up to 2 years of prison and a fine of $250,000.27
1. CASH BRIBES FOR LAND USE ACTIONS
In the land use arena, bribes have reportedly been given to officials to
vote a certain way for variances, zoning approval, granting develop-
ment rights, and other land use decisions.28 For example, in United
States v. Curescu,29 defendant Curescu converted residential buildings
to apartments.30 Curescu paid about $10,000 to an FBI informant and
professional expediter, Catherine Romasanta, to alter the computer
mainframe records to show that Curescu’s building originally con-
tained more units and to pay off a city inspector to overlook the
code violations.31 Curescu had used Romasanta on previous projects,
for which he paid her about $4,000 for each additional unit he sought.32
Between 2004 and 2007, Romasanta passed about $187,000 to more
than 25 Chicago officials for favorable treatment, including expedited
building inspections, grants of variances, and inspectors’ approvals of
code violations.33 Curescu was arrested and subsequently convicted of
conspiracy to bribe a public official (the zoning inspector), bribery of a
zoning inspector, and bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666.34
Romasanta assisted the FBI again in United States v. Reese,35 help-
ing convict supervising building inspector Reese who perpetrated a
bribery scheme with two other Chicago officials. Reese apparently
conspired with a building inspector and building contractor to accept
money from other individuals to issue certificates of occupancy, expe-
25. Id. at 405.
26. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 3571.
27. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(c), 3571.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Boone, 628 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2010).
29. United States v. Curescu, No. 08 CR 398, 2011 WL 2600572 (N.D. Ill. June 29,
2011).
30. Id. at *1.
31. Id. at *2.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at *11. See infra Part II.C. for discussion of 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012).
35. 666 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2012).
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dite permit approvals, and grant variances. It was alleged that in about
a year and a half, Reese was personally accountable for $117,000 in
bribes.36 He was sentenced to sixty months imprisonment.37
2. SERVICES IN EXCHANGE FOR REZONING
Any good or service that is given or performed in order to elicit some
benefit in the form of an official act may constitute bribery. Some-
times, the benefit received does not take the form of tangible items
like cash or a gift, but instead takes the form of services. In United
States v. Boender,38 the defendant purchased property in an industrial
district and sought to have it rezoned for commercial and residential
uses.39 In order to facilitate the rezoning, Boender cultivated the sup-
port of the local alderman by making improvements to the alderman’s
house.40 The improvements included painting, installing new windows,
replacing several doors, and performing other interior work.41 In total,
the equivalent value of the contracting services was around $38,000.42
These services formed the basis for the charge of corruptly giving
things “of value” to a public official.43 In short, any good that is given
or services that are performed in order to elicit some benefit in the
form of an official act will constitute bribery.
3. CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN EXCHANGE
FOR PERMITS
Generally, campaign contributions are not considered to be bribes,
even though contributing to a campaign may lead a donor to expect
some sort of benefit in return.44 A campaign contribution, however,
can have the same effect as a bribe in that the donor may receive ben-
efits from the elected official as a result of the campaign contribution.
They can even be used as a tool to circumvent the bribery statute: the
donor can donate to a campaign fund instead of passing money di-
rectly to the official. Congress has passed extensive laws governing
36. Id. at 1011.
37. Id.
38. 649 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2011).
39. Id. at 651
40. Id. at 651 52.
41. Id. at 652.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 653.
44. See U.S. v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 695 (2d Cir.1990); Cf. McCormick v. U.S.,
500 U.S. 257, 271 (1991); U.S. v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 410 (7th Cir. 1993) (suggesting
that more than a mere campaign contribution is needed to be convicted under the
Hobbs Act).
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campaign finance and contributions so that a “loophole” in one law is
closed by another law.45
For instance, many states and the federal government impose limits
on the amount of money a person can contribute to a political candi-
date’s campaign.46 To get around this limitation, a candidate may ask
a campaign contributor to write a number of checks just below the max-
imum dollar amount permitted by that jurisdiction for contributions
using false names of contributors or the names of others as a ruse.47
Such was the tactic of the defendant in Boender. The defendant, in
his efforts to procure favorable outcomes for rezoning applications, con-
tributed to the alderman’s aunt’s congressional campaign under his own
name and false names, and also reimbursed his workers for their contri-
butions.48 This loophole was closed by laws prohibiting a person from
making donations in the name of another person.49 Congress passed 2
U.S.C. § 441(f ), proscribing contributions made “in the name of another
person or knowingly permitting his name to be used to effect such a
contribution.”50 By extension, § 441(f ) also prohibits a person from
knowingly “accept[ing] a contribution made by one person in the
name of another person.”51 In the Boender case, the court held that
this statute unambiguously proscribes “straw man”—as well as false
name—contributions and found that Boender had violated § 441(f).52
Again, intent is important. As touched upon before, campaign con-
tributions are somewhat odd in that, on their face, they operate much
like a bribe, although they do not usually constitute a bribe due to lack
of intent. For example, the basic premise of a campaign contribution is
that the constituent donates money with the expectation of receiving
some benefit in return, but what is lacking is an agreement that the
45. See David Schultz, Proving Political Corruption: Documenting the Evidence
Required to Sustain Campaign Finance Reform Laws, 18 REV. LITIG. 85 (1999).
46. FED. ELECTION COMM’N., CONTRIBUTION LIMITS 2013 14, http://www.fec.gov/
pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml; NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
STATE LIMITATIONS ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES 2011 2012 ELECTION CYCLE,
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/Limits to Candidates 2011 2012.
pdf (last updated Sept. 2011).
47. See United States v. Beldini, 443 F. App’x 709, 710 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[The de
fendant] broke the money up into smaller increments to conceal the identity of the real
contributor.”).
48. Boender, 649 F.3d at 653.
49. 2 U.S.C. § 441f (2012) (“No person shall make a contribution in the name of
another person or knowingly permit his name to be used to effect such a contribution,
and no person shall knowingly accept a contribution made by one person in the name
of another person.”).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Boender, 649 F.3d at 660.
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payment will influence an official act.53 A bribe doubling as a cam-
paign contribution will not insulate it from scrutiny.54 A campaign
contribution may be more likely to fly under the radar of law enforce-
ment if it has a legitimate alternative explanation, such as representing
a citizen’s general support for the candidate and his views, than if
there is no legitimate alternative explanation.55 To rebut this alternative
and support a finding of a quid pro quo, the prosecution would have to
look at the circumstances surrounding the contribution to ensure it was a
legitimate contribution rather than a bribe.56
B. Extortion Under Color of Official
Right—Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951
The Hobbs Act,57 enacted in 1946, provides that a public official is
guilty of extortion “under color of official right” when he induces
someone to relinquish their property in exchange for some act that
the official is already under a duty to perform.58 In short, an official
who chooses to use or refrain from using his authority in order to in-
duce payment from someone has violated the Hobbs Act. This Act
therefore embraces bribery under title 18 U.S.C. § 201, but unlike
that statute,59 the Hobbs Act is applicable to government officials at
all levels, not just federal, and no quid pro quo is required.60 To be
convicted under the Hobbs Act, it is sufficient for a politician merely
to accept property to which he is not entitled knowing it was given in
exchange for official acts.61 The Hobbs Act, however, is narrower than
53. See United States v. Terry, 707 F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 2013) (“So long as a public
official agrees that payments will influence an official act, that suffices.”).
54. Id. at 613.
55. See United States v. McGregor, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1314 (M.D. Ala. 2012)
(“[T]he government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a campaign contribu
tion was ‘made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to per
form or not to perform an official act.’ ”).
56. See id. (“Whatever ethical considerations and appearances may indicate, to hold
that legislators commit the federal crime of extortion when they act for the benefit of
constituents or support legislation furthering the interests of some of their constituents,
shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited and received from those ben
eficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment of what Congress could have meant by making it
a crime to obtain property from another, with his consent, ‘under color of official right.”
(quoting McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 272 (1991))).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
58. Id.; see also Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 273 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (determining that “the word ‘induced’ in the statutory definition of extor
tion applies to the phrase ‘under color of official right.’ ”).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Manzo, 636 F.3d 56, 60 (3d Cir. 2011) (“For the gov
ernment to prove a violation of the Hobbs Act . . . it ‘need only show that a public
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§ 201 in that only the government official would be guilty of extortion
under the Hobbs Act. Under § 201, both the donor and the official
would be guilty of a federal felony.62
One of the most recent high-profile arrests of a government official
for extortion under color of official right was that of Martha Shoffner,
the Arkansas State Treasurer, who was accused of passing large sums
of the state’s bond holdings to a single individual in exchange for over
$30,000.63 According to federal prosecutors, Shoffner extorted thou-
sands of dollars from a securities broker who sought a larger share of
the state’s bond business. She resigned before being formally removed
from office and faced up to twenty years in prison, a fine of $250,000,
or both.64 Her trial is scheduled to begin March 3, 2014.65
One Hobbs Act case that specifically relates to land use is Van Pelt v.
United States.66 In Van Pelt, the defendant was a New Jersey Assembly-
man and a Waretown Township Committeeman who promised to help
an undercover FBI cooperator (Solomon Dwek) acquire permits and
Department of Environmental Protection approval for a fictitious devel-
opment.67 In return, Dwek passed $10,000 to Van Pelt and also prom-
ised to meet with other committee members and bribe them if necessary
to expedite the process and render a favorable decision for Dwek.68 Van
Pelt’s willingness to accept Dwek’s payment in return for his assistance
in obtaining the necessary government approvals violated the Hobbs Act
official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the pay
ment was made in return for official acts’ ”); United States v. Donna, 366 Fed.
App’x 441, 449 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he official does not have to promise to perform
a specific action in exchange for a specific gift; instead, the official can accept a
‘stream of benefits’ in exchange for one or more official acts as though the official
is on a retainer.”); United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]o
obtain conviction for Hobbs Act extortion, it was sufficient for government to
prove that former mayor understood that he was expected, as a result of payment,
to exercise particular kinds of influence, on behalf of the donor, as specific opportu
nities arose”).
62. See United States v. Brock, 501 F.3d 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2007) (the donor of a
bribe to a government official cannot “conspire with that official to extort property
from himself in violation of the Hobbs Act”).
63. Ana Campoy, Arkansas Official Accused of Extortion, WALL ST. J., May 20,
2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323463704578495452219840198.
html.
64. Id.
65. Chuck Bartels, Government describes evidence for Shoffner trial, THE WASH-
INGTON TIMES, Feb. 17, 2014, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/17/
government describes evidence for shoffner trial/.
66. Van Pelt v. United States, Civ. No. 11 6810 JAP, 2013 WL 592285 (D.N.J.
Feb. 14, 2013).
67. Id. at *1.
68. Id.
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because, as a committeeman, Van Pelt was required to evaluate permit
applications.69 Van Pelt was sentenced to forty-one months in prison.70
C. 18 U.S.C. § 666—Bribery Concerning Programs
Receiving Federal Funds
Another tool in the arsenal of federal prosecutors is 18 U.S.C. § 666,
which criminalizes theft or bribery in programs receiving federal
funds.71 This statute was created in the wake of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Dixon v. United States,72 which limited § 201 to federal
officials. As a result, Congress passed § 666 to establish criminal lia-
bility for agents of any organization, government, or agency who “cor-
ruptly solicit[] or demand[] . . . anything of value” worth more than
$5,00073 when the official’s employing organization receives more
than $10,000 in federal funds during a twelve-month period.74
This statute has provided federal prosecutors with a powerful tool for
combating corruption in a wide array of circumstances including state
and local governments, thus shifting from a statute with an original
purpose to protect federal funds to a general anti-corruption statute.75
The scope of § 666 is incredibly broad; all states and most municipal-
ities receive some form of federal funding above $10,000 annually.76
The far-reaching applicability has implicated officials on grounds
that are tenuous at best. For example, former Illinois Governor Rod
Blagojevich was convicted under § 666 for threatening to block state
funding for a hospital unless its CEO contributed $50,000 to his cam-
paign, which has nothing to do with mishandling federal funds, but
not for the more infamous charge of attempting to sell a then-vacant
Senate seat.77 Boender is also evidence of § 666’s expansive public cor-
ruption scope. In Boender, bribing the alderman with contracting ser-
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012).
72. Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 496 (1984).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (2012).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2012).
75. See United States v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536, 1543 (S.D. Cal. 1996); see also
United States v. Cicco, 938 F.2d 441, 446 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Congress intended § 666 to
address different and more serious criminal activity.”).
76. Part of the reason for these attenuated links is that federal funds need not be
affected in any way for a § 666 violation to have occurred. See Salinas v. United
States, 522 U.S. 52, 56 57 (1997) (“The enactment’s expansive, unqualified language,
both as to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered, does not support the interpre
tation that federal funds must be affected to violate § 666(a)(1)(B).”).
77. See Rod Blagojevich Public Corruption Case, FBI.GOV (Mar. 12, 2012), http://
www.fbi.gov/news/podcasts/inside/rod blagojevich public corruption case.mp3/view;
Brian Greene, Rod Blagojevich Begins 14 year Prison Sentence. US NEWS, Mar. 15,
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vices served as the basis of the § 666 count,78 yet neither Boender nor
the alderman exchanged money or affected federal distribution of
funds in any way. Even with this tenuous link, the defendant’s convic-
tion was upheld.79 Under § 666, it matters only that the government,
organization, or agency receives federal funds, and not that these funds
were implicated in influencing a public official.80
Another key distinction between § 666 and § 201 is that § 201 re-
quires a quid pro quo; the federal circuit courts of appeals are split
on whether § 666 requires a quid pro quo. The Second,81 Fourth82
and Eighth83 Circuit Courts of Appeals require proof of a quid pro
quo while the Sixth,84 Seventh,85 and Eleventh86 Circuits do not. There-
fore, in some jurisdictions conviction under § 666 can result merely
from proof of money being given to a public official with an attempt
to reward or influence him.87
1. SOLICITING BRIBES TO EXPEDITE PERMIT PROCESS
United States v. Beldini88 exemplifies § 666 in a land use context. In
Beldini, Solomon Dwek, an FBI coordinator, posed as a real estate de-
2012, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/03/15/rod blagojevich begins 14
year prison sentence.
78. Boender, 649 F.3d at 653.
79. Id. at 661.
80. See Salinas, 522 U.S. at 57 (“The prohibition [of accepting a bribe] is not con
fined to a business or transaction which affects federal funds. The word ‘any,’ which
prefaces the business or transaction clause, undercuts the attempt to impose this nar
rowing construction.”).
81. Ganim, 510 F.3d at 151 (holding there was no plain error in a jury instruction
that stated that the government must prove a corrupt intent, which “means the intent to
engage in some specific quid pro quo”).
82. United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1014 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
“corrupt intent” requirement in § 666 requires the government to prove a quid pro
quo).
83. United States v. Redzic, 627 F.3d 683 (8th Cir. 2010).
84. United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 520 (6th Cir. 2009) (“While a ‘quid pro
quo of money for a specific . . . act is sufficient to violate [18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B)],’
it is ‘not necessary” (quoting United States v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir.
2005))).
85. Gee, 432 F.3d at 714 (“A quid pro quo of money for a specific legislative act is
sufficient to violate the statute, but it is not necessary.”).
86. United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1188 (11th Cir. 2010) (“There is no
requirement in § 666(a)(1)(B) or (a)(2) that the government allege or prove an intent
that a specific payment was solicited, received, or given in exchange for a specific of
ficial act, termed a quid pro quo.”); see also United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d
1159, 1170 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that “the Supreme Court has not yet considered
whether the federal funds bribery, conspiracy or honest services mail fraud statutes
require a similar ‘explicit promise’ [by the official to perform or not perform an offi
cial act].”).
87. McNair, 605 F.3d at 1188.
88. United States v. Beldini, 443 F. App’x 709 (2011).
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veloper in order to unearth corruption at City Hall.89 In 2009, Leona
Beldini was the Deputy Mayor of Jersey City reporting directly to
the Mayor, Jerramiah Healy.90 Solomon Dwek, the same FBI cooper-
ator from Van Pelt, posed as a real estate developer in order to unearth
corruption in City Hall.91 When Dwek attempted to set up a meeting
with the mayor, he was referred to Beldini.92 In return for obtaining
the necessary permits and approvals from various city agencies,
Dwek promised to retain Beldini as the exclusive broker to sell the
development’s units and to donate thousands of dollars to Healy’s
campaign fundraising funds.93 Beldini assured Dwek and the other of-
ficials that she could funnel the bribes through three different cam-
paign accounts and that she would break up the money into smaller
increments to conceal the true identity of the donor.94 For these ac-
tions, Beldini was charged with federal program bribery in violation
of § 666, and conspiracy to commit extortion under color of official
right, in violation of the Hobbs Act.95 Beldini was acquitted of the
Hobbs Act charge, but was convicted of bribery under § 666 because
the court determined that Beldini was an “agent” of a government, and
that the campaign contributions were “things of value,”96 thereby sus-
taining the federal program bribery conviction.97 Furthermore, there
was no legitimate alternative explanation Beldini could proffer to es-
tablish that the donations had a legal purpose.98
2. OVERZEALOUSLY REPRESENTING A CLIENT MAY
LEAD TO CONSPIRACY FOR AN ATTORNEY
In United States v. Ciresi,99 Robert Ciresi, a seventy-eight year old at-
torney, was charged with conspiring to purchase the votes of corrupt
town councilmen regarding two zoning matters.100 One of Ciresi’s cli-
ents applied to the town council to rezone residential land so the client
89. Id. at 710.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 711.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 712.
96. Id. at 719 (“The campaign contributions at issue are thousands of dollars. Bel
dini’s proposition that this money is not a thing of value strains credulity.”).
97. Id. at 721.
98. Beldini would also have a difficult time explaining why, if the donations were
legitimate, she divided the $10,000 into smaller increments, concealed the true iden
tity of the donor, and funneled them through different campaign fund accounts.
99. United States v. Ciresi, 697 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2012).
100. Id. at 23.
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could build a supermarket.101 Ciresi set up the meeting at which his
client agreed to pay $25,000 in exchange for the votes of the city coun-
cilmen, and Ciresi made it clear that his client wanted his application to
be approved with no conditions. For the first project, the council ap-
proved the application and the conspirators split $25,000.102 For the
second project, Ciresi represented two developers seeking to convert
an industrial mill complex into apartments.103 Zambarano and Ciresi
again sought to exact a bribe from them, but Ciresi eventually backed
out.104 However, Zambarano and the informant still managed to secure
a bribe, and the rezoning application was subsequently approved.105
Ciresi was later charged and convicted of bribing a local government
official in violation of § 666 and conspiring to commit the same.106
His attempts to procure favorable results for his clients’ applications
by purchasing votes were undoubtedly unethical, and also subjected
him to criminal punishment.107
D. 18 U.S.C. § 1346—Theft of Honest Services
The predecessor to the modern-day mail and wire fraud laws origi-
nated in 1872 and proscribed the use of mail to perpetrate “any scheme
or artifice to defraud.”108 Congress amended the statute in 1909 to in-
clude “any scheme or artifice to defraud, obtaining money or property
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or prom-
ises.”109 One after another, the U.S. Courts of Appeals interpreted
the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” as including deprivations of
intangible rights in addition to deprivations of money or property.110
The “theft of honest services” doctrine was created in Shushan v.
United States111 when the Fifth Circuit equated a bribe of a public of-
ficial to a scheme to defraud the public.112 In essence, the logic is this:
a bribe is a type of fraud, and fraud is a type of theft, and what the
101. Id.
102. Id. at 23 24.
103. Id. at 24.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 25.
107. Id. at 32.
108. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 399 (2010) (quoting McNally v.
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987)).
109. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
110. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 400 401.
111. Shusan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941).
112. Id. at 115.
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defendants are “stealing” is their constituents’ right to an honest offi-
cial as part of an honest government.113
In 1988, Congress codified the judicial concept of “honest services”
in 18 U.S.C. § 1346.114 This was a windfall for prosecutors because
“honest services” could mean almost anything, and prosecutors en-
compassed public and corporate fraud, as well as other forms of dis-
honesty, in its scope. However, major restrictions on § 1346 were im-
posed when the Supreme Court decided Skilling v. United States.115
There, the Court limited § 1346’s application to only bribes and kick-
backs116 in order to save the overbroad statute from being invalidated
for unconstitutional vagueness.117
More likely than not, a charge of theft of honest services will com-
plement other related crimes such as bribery, extortion, and money
laundering. As it relates to land use, honest services fraud can result
from accepting seemingly innocuous assistance from acquaintances
and returning the favor in the form of official acts. For instance, in
United States v. Wright,118 the defendant was the chief of staff to a
Philadelphia city councilman while also maintaining his side job as
a realtor.119 Wright’s office was in the same building as Ravinder
Chawla, owner of a real estate firm, and Andrew Teitelman, an attor-
ney who did not work for Chawla but whose practice was almost ex-
clusive to representing Chawla’s firm.120
The three befriended one another, so when Wright began facing
legal and housing trouble while going through a contentious divorce,
Chawla and Teitelman assisted him by letting him stay rent free in an
113. Deirdre Van Dyk, The Supreme Court’s Ruling on ‘Honest Services’ Theft,
TIME MAGAZINE (June 25, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/
0,8599,1999768,00.html (“The honest services law purports to make it a federal
crime to deprive someone of honest services to which that person is entitled”).
114. Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100 690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
115. 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
116. Id. at 408 09.
117.
[T]here is no doubt that Congress intended § 1346 to reach at least bribes and kick
backs. Reading the statute to proscribe a wider range of offensive conduct, we
acknowledge, would raise the due process concerns underlying the vagueness doc
trine. To preserve the statute without transgressing constitutional limitations, we
now hold that § 1346 criminalizes only the bribe and kickback core of the pre
McNally case law.
Id.
118. United States v. Wright, 665 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 2012).
119. Id. at 565.
120. Id.
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apartment and giving him free legal advice.121 Chawla also promised
exclusive commissions on his company’s projects to Wright.122 In re-
turn, Wright acted on behalf of Chawla’s firm by expediting and grant-
ing a zoning variance application, opposing a proposed ordinance that
would cripple one of the firm’s projects, and passing along knowledge
about potential sales of city property before it became public.123
A conviction for honest services fraud requires the fact finder to find
two things: first, that the donor provided something of value to a pub-
lic official expecting to receive favorable treatment that would not nor-
mally be given, and second, that the official accepted those benefits
with the intent to promote the donor’s interests.124 More importantly,
for a situation like the one that developed in Wright, each quid, or thing
“of value,” does not need to be directly linked to a quo, or the official
act.125 Instead, a bribe can take the form of a “stream of benefits,”126
making the statute’s reach even more expansive.
In the Wright case, Wright received mutual and contemporaneous
benefits, including a free stint in an apartment, commissions, and
free legal services.127 Wright was simultaneously using his official
position to benefit Chawla and Teitelman by assisting them with zon-
ing issues and offering other political support.128 In addition to the
ethics charges that emerged as a result of these self-dealings and con-
flicts of interest, criminal charges including honest services fraud and
bribery were brought against all three individuals.129 State and local
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 566.
124. Id. at 568 (citing United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 240 41 (3d Cir.
2011)).
125. Id.
126.
[T]he Government is not required to present evidence that attributes each official
action to a corrupt payment. It is enough for the [G]overnment to present evidence
that shows a course of conduct of favors and gifts flowing to a public official in ex
change for a pattern of official actions favorable to the donor. Thus, payments may
be made with the intent to retain the official’s services on an ‘as needed’ basis, so
that whenever the opportunity presents itself the official will take specific action on
the payor’s behalf. The evidence of a quid pro quo can be implicit, that is, a con
viction can occur if the Government shows that [the defendant] accepted payments
or other consideration with the implied understanding that he would perform or not
perform an act in his official capacity.
United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original).
127. Wright, 665 F.3d at 568.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 576 577. The Third Circuit determined that the district court judge’s
jury instructions were erroneous, so the convictions were vacated and the case was re
manded for a new trial. Id. at 577 78.
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attorneys therefore need to be cognizant of federal laws regulating
such unethical behavior in order to represent their clients more
effectively.
III. Examples of Criminal Activities in the Land Use
Context at the State Level
A. Bridgeport Mayor
Joseph P. Ganim served as Mayor of Bridgeport, Connecticut, from
1991 until he was convicted in 2003 of bribery, racketeering, and hon-
est services fraud.130 During his term Ganim became acquainted
with Leonard Grimaldi, the sole proprietor of a public relations com-
pany, and Paul Pinto, who was associated with an architecture and en-
gineering firm.131 Ganim used his inside knowledge of Bridgeport’s
projects to the economic advantage of Grimaldi and Pinto, who
would then provide benefits to Ganim in return.132 Ganim’s role in
this scheme was to steer city contracts to companies represented by
Grimaldi and Pinto, increasing the benefits to them.133 By using his
position as a public official for personal economic gain, Ganim vio-
lated Connecticut’s Code of Ethics for Public Officials, which strictly
proscribes using one’s official position for personal financial gain.134
By awarding contracts to Grimaldi and Pinto and sharing in their
fees, Ganim managed to collect tens of thousands of dollars in cash
and gifts135 from his two co-conspirators. Not surprisingly, this type
of ethics violation is also a violation of two federal laws: extortion
under the Hobbs Act in violation of § 1951, and bribery involving pro-
grams receiving federal funds in violation of § 666. For these criminal
offenses, Ganim was sentenced to 108 months imprisonment.136
B. New Orleans Mayor
In another situation involving ethics violations that led to criminal
charges, the former Mayor of New Orleans, C. Ray Nagin, engaged
in self-dealing transactions involving kickbacks and other benefits.
130. Ganim, 510 F.3d at 136 37 (2d Cir. 2007).
131. Id. at 137.
132. Id. at 137 40.
133. Id. at 138.
134. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1 84 (c) (2013).
135. A public official is also prohibited from receiving a “gift,” defined as “any
thing of value,” from restricted donors, including those seeking to do business with
the department or agency. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1 79 (e) (2013).
136. Ganim, 510 F.3d at 136.
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According to the grand jury indictment, Nagin used his position as
mayor to approve an ordinance that would allow a retail corporation
to purchase certain property.137 At the same time, Nagin negotiated a
business arrangement with the same corporation that would personally
benefit his family-owned granite business.138 Additionally, and simi-
larly to Ganim, Nagin awarded numerous city contracts to contractors
(or, in this case, co-conspirators) in exchange for kickbacks and pay-
offs, as well as accepted illicit gifts in the form of free granite for
his company.139 These self-dealing actions, along with many others, vi-
olated § 1346 by depriving the citizens of New Orleans of honest ser-
vices and § 666 for bribery involving a federally funded program.140
In February of 2014, Nagin was convicted on twenty counts of fraud
and bribery.141
IV. Conclusion
Public officials must be on notice that unethical conduct could poten-
tially expose them to criminal liability. Because federal prosecutors
and law enforcement officials are taking a more visible role in govern-
ment corruption, the increased instances of arrests and the resulting
media attention show that political corruption in the land use arena
is widespread. This culture of corruption, infecting all levels of gov-
ernment, is aptly described in the introduction by a U.S. Attorney as
“barnacles on the bottom of a boat”142 because barnacles will inevita-
bly appear on a boat that takes no preventative measures and will hin-
der the performance of the boat by causing drag. Similarly, corruption,
as a byproduct of human fallibility and susceptibility, appears to be in-
herent in our system of government; without investigations into and
arrests of corrupt public officials, the public’s trust in government
will be eroded and the ability of government agencies and officials
to get things done would be hampered.
While no area of government at any level is immune from unethical
and corrupt conduct, as demonstrated above, with respect to land use
137. Indictment at 10, United States v. Nagin, No. 13 11, 2013 WL 5532516 (E.D.
La., Jan. 18, 2013), available at http://ftpcontent.worldnow.com/wvue/documents/
20130118114952280.pdf.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 6.
140. Id. at 8.
141. Campbell Robertson, Nagin Guilty of 20 Counts of Bribery and Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/13/us/nagin corruption verdict.
html? r=0.
142. Odato, supra note 7.
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in particular, criminal liability can emerge from ethics violations such
as self-dealing or conflicts of interest. Without even a basic under-
standing of the public corruption statutes set forth above, a municipal
attorney can unknowingly compound the penalties for a public official
client who faces charges of ethics infractions perceived to be merely
civil in nature. This issue is significant in light of the increase in fed-
eral attention to government corruption and the correspondingly high
number of convictions in general and specifically in the land use
context.143
143. See PUB. INTEGRITY SECTION, supra note 5.
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